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INTRODUCTION 
 
Robert Stern 
 
Many philosophical schools can be readily seen to have a natural affinity and 
interconnection: existentialism and phenomenology for example, or 
materialism and naturalism, where several thinkers and themes on each side 
stand intertwined. But a look at the history of idealism and pragmatism may 
seem to tell a different story.  
 
Idealism is the older tradition, with roots in Plato and Platonism, and has 
developed into a myriad of forms: for example, platonic idealism, Berkeleyian 
idealism, rationalist idealism, Kantian idealism, and absolute idealism. 
Underlying this variety is the claim that reality contains more than matter, but 
is also constituted by ideas or mental structures, where it is an issue for 
dispute within this tradition whether these ideas are outside and prior to 
individual minds and if so whether they also exist independent of the material 
world; whether they only exist in such minds, as does reality itself; or whether 
reality consists in some combination of mind-imposed ideas and mind-
independent elements. Very roughly, the first option is explored by Plato in the 
one direction, whose ideas exist independently of the material world, and in 
the other direction by Aristotle, whose forms are instantiated in matter, while 
the so-called ‘objective idealism’ of Schelling and Hegel may be seen as 
descendant of this line of thought. The second option may be associated with 
Berkeley, where the mind in question is divine. The third option is broadly 
Kant’s, whose ‘formal’ or ‘transcendental’ idealism treats the conceptual 
structure as a mind-imposed structure on a mind independent reality of things-
in-themselves. Many other figures can be associated with this tradition in 
various ways, including Arthur Schopenhauer, the neo-Kantians of the late 
nineteenth century, and the British Idealists such as T. H. Green and F. H. 
Bradley; and while it suffered something of an eclipse with the rise of analytic 
philosophy and contemporary naturalism, it remains a living option within 
many field and in many forms, including Platonism in the philosophy of 
mathematics and transcendental idealist accounts of modality.  The 
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intellectual power of the idealist tradition is indicated by its longevity, where 
amongst other things it claims to offer a unique solution to questions 
concerning knowledge, the law-like features of the natural world, freedom, 
and the place of norms and values within reality. 
 
Pragmatism as such is more of a new-comer, with its acknowledged origins 
being traceable to the work of philosophers such as C. S. Peirce and William 
James in the mid nineteenth century - though arguably the antecedents of this 
tradition go back to earlier figures such as Thomas Reid. The outlook can be 
summarized in the so-called pragmatic maxim of Peirce, that we should 
‘Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object’.1 As such, pragmatism 
offers a distinctive account of meaning, knowledge and metaphysics, which is 
opposed to the abstractions of a philosophy that has no relation to our 
activities within the world. 
 
Laid out in this way, it may seem that idealism and pragmatism can have little 
to do with one another and should indeed be seen as intellectual opponents; 
and some of their defenders have in fact viewed their relation in this way. So, 
it may appear on the one hand to the pragmatist, that the idealist represents 
just the kind of empty and abstract metaphysical theorizing that she wants to 
overturn, while to the idealist on the other hand, the pragmatist may be 
viewed as offering a position that cannot resolve the problems that concern 
him, in refusing to engage with them properly by offering instead a crude 
appeal to ‘practical consequences’. It could be assumed, then, that these two 
traditions will simply confront each other as philosophical opposites. 
Moreover, this suspicion can be reinforced by two further considerations: first, 
that while idealism flourished mainly on continental Europe, pragmatism took 
root in American soil, understood by some of its proponents as a distinctive 
philosophy designed for a new world; and second, that as a consciously 
                                                        
1 ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ [1878], in Peirce 1958-66, 5.402 [references 
by volume and paragraph number]. This is only one of several formulations 
that Peirce provides of the maxim: for further discussion, see Hookway 2012.  
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radical and reforming intellectual movement, pragmatism surely sought to 
overthrow its worn-out predecessors, idealism included. 
 
However, on closer inspection, it is clear that historically the position is much 
more complex than this stark contrast would suggest, while looking forward, 
there is much to be learned from exploring common ground, as well as 
thinking more deeply about where the divergences between the two traditions 
may lie. So, for example, while historically F. H. Bradley and William James 
presented themselves as at odds in their published writings, in their private 
correspondences they recognized a greater degree of convergence; 2  and 
while Peirce on occasion denounced both Kant and Hegel, he also on other 
occasions expressed his warm appreciation for their views.3 Likewise, figures 
like Royce, Dewey and Sellars were explicit in claiming a shared ancestry for 
their views.4 There was also a good deal of intellectual cross-fertilization, with 
better communication across languages and cultures than in fact is common 
now; and while pragmatism did sometimes present itself as the iconoclastic 
new-comer, it also often rooted itself in a concern for the history of previous 
forms of thought, whilst in their turn many idealists sought to learn from this 
new development in the field. 
 
And more thematically, there is much that suggests how far idealism and 
pragmatism can be aligned, for example in relation to the question of 
naturalism and how that should be best conceived, or in relation to scepticism 
and how that is to be dealt with, or in considering the issue of how social 
norms arise and how they come to be upheld. Indeed, it is this kind of 
common ground that explains how many of the most prominent contemporary 
philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, 
Robert Brandom, Richard Bernstein and others, may be said to draw 
                                                        
2 Cf. Kenna 1966, and Perry 1936, vol 2, 485-93, 637-44.  
3 Cf. Peirce’s comment that “My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a 
strange costume” (1958-66, 1.42), and that his critical commonsensism was 
“but a modification of Kantism” (1958-66, 5.452). Peirce also remarks on 
Kant’s influence on his formulation of the pragmatic maxim itself, commenting 
that he “was led to the maxim by reflection on Kant’s Critic of the Pure 
Reason” (1958-66, 5.3; cf. also 6.490). 
4 See for example Good 2006.  
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inspiration from both these traditions, in finding ways in which they can 
reinforce one another. 
 
However, while this rapprochement is an underlying feature of both the history 
and current profile of philosophical thought, it has so far received little explicit 
reflection and analysis, where it now seems important and timely to try to fill 
this gap.5 The hope is that by shedding light on where these traditions stand, 
both historically and conceptually, this will lead to a greater appreciation of 
their individual strengths and weaknesses, and their real similarities and 
differences. The aim here is not mere eclecticism or to reduce each side to 
bland uniformity, but rather to explore where each can learn from the other, 
both in terms of finding common ground, and in offering mutual critiques. As 
such, this will also enable us to better gauge where these traditions should 
also be placed in the wider philosophical landscape, for example in relation to 
realism, naturalism, supernaturalism and so on, and thus with reference to 
fundamental disputes in metaphysics, epistemology, value theory, political 
philosophy and philosophy of religion. At the same time, closer investigation 
will bring out the important differences between thinkers within each tradition, 
so on some issues it may turn out that so-called idealists are closer to so-
called pragmatists than they are to other idealists, and likewise for 
pragmatists: for example, Bradley’s anti-intellectualism has more in common 
with James than it does with many of the more orthodox Hegelian idealists 
with whom he is usually classified.  
 
The focus of this particular publication is historical, and seeks to explore some 
of the concrete connections between thinkers in both traditions. This is an 
extremely rich field, the full potential of which has yet to be developed, and 
clearly a collection of articles such as this can make no claim to 
comprehensiveness. Nonetheless, the hope is that the particular focus of 
                                                        
5 This publication is part of the ‘Idealism and Pragmatism’ project which aims 
to consider the issue more widely: see http://idealismandpragmatism.org. It 
grew out of a conference on the historical connections between idealism and 
pragmatism, held in Sheffield in October 2013. Two other papers from the 
Sheffield conference are to be published elsewhere: Gava forthcoming and 
Westphal forthcoming.  
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these articles will shed important light on the details and significance of these 
debates between major figures in the field. 
 
Of the four classical German Idealists – Kant, Hegel, Fichte and Schelling – 
one central focus here is Hegel, who figures in the first three articles by Dina 
Emundts, Steven Levine and Paul Redding. Both Kant and Hegel are 
discussed in Preston Stovall’s article, which compares them to Peirce on the 
issue of non-deductive inference and the reflecting power of judgement, while 
John Kaag takes up the relation between Kantian aesthetics and pragmatism. 
The connection between Kant and pragmatism is also covered in a related 
publication that has also grown out of this project.6 Schelling is discussed in 
the article by Franks, which identifies him as a central influence on Peirce. Of 
the four classical German Idealists, Fichte is not covered in any detail; but 
some of his ideas, such as the way in which an ungrounded choice of 
attitudes lies behind key philosophical disputes, might well be related to 
James’s emphasis on the clash of temperaments on which many of our 
philosophical debates rely. 7  After this ‘classical’ period the connections 
between idealism and pragmatism become very broad, as the British, 
American and European Idealists all had links with pragmatism, some aspects 
of which have been explored elsewhere.8 This collection provides important 
discussions of this rich material, where Shannon Dea focuses on the link 
between Royce, Peirce and James and their background in Spinoza, and 
Jeremy Dunham explores the relation between James and the French idealist 
Charles Renouvier. More recent connections are considered by Giuseppina 
D’Oro, who analyses the differences and similarities between Carnap’s 
pragmatism and Collingwood’s idealism on the question of metaphysics. 
D’Oro’s findings resemble those of the other articles, that in general suggest 
                                                        
6 Gava and Stern (eds) 2015.  
7 Cf. Fichte 1982, 14-15; Fichte 1845-46, vol 1, 433-4: ‘Hence the choice 
[between idealism and dogmatism] is governed by caprice, and since even a 
capricious decision must have some source, it is governed by inclination and 
interest. The ultimate basis of the difference between idealists and dogmatists 
is thus the difference of their interests’. And cf. James, Pragmatism, in 1975-
88, vol 1, 11: ‘The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain 
clash of human temperaments’. 
8 For a bibliography, see http://idealismandpragmatism.org/bibliography. 
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the history of these two approaches are much more closely and profitably 
intertwined than many would suppose. 
 
In what follows, I will provide a summary of the articles in rather more detail. 
 
In her paper ‘Hegel as a Pragmatist’, Dina Emundts takes up the question of 
how far pragmatist themes can be found in Hegel’s thought, and defends a 
positive response. She begins by identifying two central features of 
pragmatism as she understands it: first, that it is suspicious of claims to a 
priori knowledge, and second the related idea that knowledge involves doing 
and testing. She then turns to consider Hegel, beginning by focusing on the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Having sketched Hegel’s critique of Kant’s method 
in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, Emundts uses his account of sense 
certainty to illustrate how Hegel’s approach involves consciousness testing its 
account of knowledge and experiencing how it fails, where it is that 
experience that drives it forward. While recognizing that the procedure of the 
Logic is apparently more abstract, Emundts nonetheless argues that the way 
that concepts are analysed in this text is still in terms of testing our views of 
these concepts, and seeing how they break down. She also considers in 
some detail the challenge that this overlooks the respects in which the Logic 
is a priori, which if substantiated would contradict her reading of Hegel as a 
pragmatist. Whilst she thinks this challenge can be defeated, she does 
nonetheless outline some limits to her thesis that Hegel is a pragmatist. The 
first point she considers is that Hegel’s conception of knowledge is more 
ambitious than that of the pragmatists, while secondly he adopts a form of 
conceptual realism. Emundts discusses these differences in some detail, 
together with the underlying question of how the two sides consider the 
question of metaphysics, but argues that overall these differences should not 
deflect us from seeing the more significant similarities that remain. 
 
Steven Levine’s paper ‘Hegel, Habits, and Pragmatism’ begins with another 
way of relating Hegel to pragmatism, this time offered by Terry Pinkard, where 
both sides are said to be looking for a way to account for normative authority 
while avoiding a kind of Platonism about norms on the one hand, and a 
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relativism or conventionalism on the other, where Hegel and the pragmatists 
are said by Pinkard to try to ‘anchor normative practices in the activities of life 
itself’. While agreeing with this broad approach, Levine argues that Pinkard 
still mischaracterizes the way the two sides deal with this issue in a way that 
then leads Pinkard to set them apart again, as his reading of pragmatism 
makes their conception of life too grounded in purely biological 
considerations, while his reading of Hegel is too constructivist in a way that 
leaves nature and hence life behind. Levine argues that the key to getting this 
balance right is to focus on what both have to say about habits and their place 
in our lives as social and historical creatures; on the one hand, from a 
pragmatist perspective this will allow us to appreciate the way in which the 
relation to our needs and interests can be dynamic and can take us beyond 
any biological givens; and on the other hand, it will allow for a properly 
sophisticated naturalism in Hegel’s account of our capacities as free agents. 
Habits thus occupy a very important and distinctive middle ground, as in 
forming them we are doing more than just responding the determinations of 
nature, but nor are we free to construct them how we like independently of our 
bodily existence; rather they enable us to incorporate that existence into our 
freedom as situated agents. Levine’s article thus contributes substantially to 
the on-going debate concerning how far Hegelianism and pragmatism should 
be considered to be naturalist positions, focused through the lens of a 
discussion of habit, where Levine brings Hegel into dialogue with Dewey on 
precisely this issue. 
 
In the third paper in the collection dealing with Hegel’s relation to pragmatism, 
Paul Redding offers ‘An Hegelian Solution to a Tangle of Problems Facing 
Brandom’s Analytic Hegelianism’. Robert Brandom is well-known for 
attempting to combine pragmatist and idealist approaches within his 
inferentialist semantics, according to which the meaning of a judgement is 
dependent on the inferential relations it stands in to other possible 
judgements. Redding characterizes this as a strong inferentialism because it 
claims not only is this necessary for meaning, but also sufficient; and he 
points out that in defending this position and the strong anti-
representationalism that it entails, Brandom takes himself to be following 
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Hegel’s radicalization of Kant, as well as pragmatists such as Peirce, Sellars 
and Quine. However, Redding challenges Brandom’s attempt to enlist Hegel 
to his cause, and on the contrary suggests that by offering a different reading 
of Hegel as no more than a weak inferentialist then we can use Hegel to 
rescue Brandom himself from four crucial difficulties: the problem of object 
perception; of de re attitudes; of perceptual experience; and of drawing a 
modal distinction between possibility and actuality. Redding articulates the 
sense in which Hegel was no more than a weak inferentialist by offering an 
nuanced and historically informed discussion of Hegel’s understanding of the 
history of logic, particularly in its Aristotelian forms, where he contends that it 
is this Aristotelianism that Brandom overlooks, but which he needs in order to 
solve the four problems outlined above, so to this extent Brandom’s attempt to 
unify the pragmatist and Hegelian traditions in his own person is 
misconceived. 
 
The paper by Preston Stovall on ‘Inference by Analogy and the Progress of 
Knowledge’ considers Kant, Hegel and Peirce against the background of 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, and how this relates to fundamental issues 
concerning the tension between mechanistic and purposive explanation. 
Stovall suggests that Kant’s notion of reflective judgement, Hegel’s account of 
inference by analogy, and Peirce’s view of abductive inference can be seen to 
be related to one another as forms of non-deductive reasoning essential to 
conceptual development. Stovall argues that the account of reflection that 
Kant uses to understand teleological judgements involves important 
analogical elements, which then in turn influenced Hegel’s account of 
analogical reasoning and Peirce’s account of abductive inference. However, it 
is suggested, Kant’s account when applied to organic things left the tension 
between teleological and mechanistic explanation unresolved, as the 
underlying analogy presumed that organic purposes could only be understood 
by analogy with minded agency. Turning to Darwin, Stovall argues that his 
reasoning in developing his account of evolution was analogical rather than 
inductive in a way that fits the models of such reasoning offered by Hegel and 
Peirce, and moreover that Darwin’s account enables us to give a retrospective 
rather than prospective account of purposiveness based on the principle of 
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selection, thus overcoming the problems that Kant faced with his intentional 
account, and enabling purposiveness to find a more stable place in our 
understanding of the world. Stovall also brings out how the American 
Pragmatists took up Darwinian reasoning, as a new form of analogical 
thinking about organic nature that can then treat our judgements of purpose in 
nature as determinative rather than merely reflective, and applied this 
reasoning to the development of new forms of explanation about mind and 
society.  
 
In her paper on ‘A House at War with Itself’, Shannon Dea uses Peirce’s 
rather neglected discussions of Spinoza to help locate Peirce in the contest 
between the sort of pluralism espoused by William James on the one hand, 
and the sort of absolutism espoused by Josiah Royce on the other – where 
tidy historical taxonimizing might lead one to expect Peirce the pragmatist to 
go with the former camp and to reject the latter as too idealist. Dea begins by 
looking in some detail at Peirce’s engagement with Spinoza, where she 
emphasizes how uncharacteristically positive about the latter Peirce could be, 
and how frequently he listed him as a crucial source for ‘the river of 
pragmatism’. At the same time, Dea points out, Peirce was clearly equivocal 
about his relation to James, where this is in part marked by Peirce’s well-
known attempt to label his position ‘pragmaticism’, as against the label of 
pragmatism that James had begun to popularize. She then focuses 
specifically on James’s attempt to defend a pluralistic spiritualism (and hence 
idealism) in A Pluralistic Universe and elsewhere, which is explicitly aimed at 
refuting the more monistic absolute idealism of the Hegelian school (as James 
saw it), particularly Royce, where Spinoza is also associated with this 
position. However, as she makes clear, Peirce was by no means enamoured 
with James’s attempts to recruit Peirce to his cause, and she brings out why 
through a careful exposition of Peirce’s view of the absolute, and how he 
thought of it in Spinozistic terms which he believed were lost on James, but 
better grasped by Royce. The key here is their respective conceptions of the 
infinite, which Peirce took to allow a proper understanding of the absolute 
which would escape James’s criticisms, while avoiding aspects of James’s 
pluralism which Peirce felt to be superficial and highly problematic, such as 
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James’s defense of a finite God. Dea thus brings out how complex the 
relations between pragmatist and idealist positions could be in this period. 
 
In the paper on ‘Peirce’s “Schelling-Fashioned Idealism” and “The Monstrous 
Mysticism of the East”’, Paul Franks focuses on the important relation 
between Peirce and Schelling, and Peirce’s claim in 1892 to have offered an 
idealism inspired by Schelling, which holds ‘matter to be mere specialized and 
partially deadened mind’. As Franks explains and explores, this allows Peirce 
to place Schelling in the exalted camp of non-nominalist realists, of which 
virtually the only other member is Peirce himself, which treats ideas not only 
as real, but also as living. It is the latter issue, Franks argues, that 
fundamentally explains Peirce’s preference for Schelling over Hegel, seeing in 
the former an evolutionary metaphysics that is missing from the latter. At the 
same time, Franks sheds light on Peirce’s other claim, that amongst others 
Schelling represented ‘the monstrous mysticism of the east’, arguing that this 
should be understood as a reference to certain key kabbalistic ideas, and how 
such ideas can be related to the cosmologies of both thinkers, particularly that 
what fundamentally needs explanation is not heterogeneity from homogeneity 
(or diversity from unity), but homogeneity from heterogeneity (or unity from 
diversity). Franks thus not only uncovers in some detail what drew Peirce to 
Schelling, and why he preferred the latter to other idealists such as Hegel, but 
also the role that this neglected tradition of Jewish thinking played in inspiring 
the cosmologies that make them so distinctive.  
 
Jeremy Dunham’s paper on ‘Idealism, Pragmatism, and the Will to Believe’ 
sets William James’s famous article against the background of Charles 
Renouvier’s idealism, and explores the influence of the latter on crucial 
aspects of James’s thinking, and also the development of pragmatism more 
broadly. Dunham begins by clarifying in what sense Renouvier should be 
considered an idealist, where he focuses on two key themes: (1) that our 
mental ideas are exemplars of the ‘really real’; and (2) that reality is 
exclusively experiential in nature, where it follows from these theses that 
reality is knowable, while what we know is experientiable. Renouiver also 
defends a ‘principle of relativity’ which treats knowledge as relative to subjects 
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and experience as relational, while offering a theory of ‘certitude’, according to 
which we hold no beliefs that are absolutely free from doubt. It is this latter 
key idea, Dunham argues, that influenced James, while showing how it could 
be built about the other aspects of Renouiver’s position, which also had 
affinities with pragmatism. For, Renouvier showed how the distinction 
between theoretical and practical reason comes under threat once his theory 
of certitude is accepted, and that belief at both levels can be subjectively 
necessary while remaining rational, thereby introducing a connection to Kant’s 
earlier treatment of the postulates, which had also given practical reason a 
kind of primacy. Dunham then uses this background to assess Renouvier’s 
impact on the argument of ‘The Will to Believe’, and to adjudicate between 
current scholarly controversies concerning this influential but problematic 
piece, particularly in the way that religious belief can be viewed as a kind of 
hypothesis, in many ways not distinguishable from hypotheses of a more 
scientific kind. Dunham thus shows how French idealism had a vital role to 
play in shaping one of the founding documents of American pragmatism. 
 
John Kaag turns from religion and science to the place of aesthetics in 
considering ‘The Lot of the Beautiful: Pragmatism and Aesthetic Ideals’. He 
advances the unusual thesis that classical pragmatism should be seen as an 
outgrowth of German aesthetic theory, particularly Kant and Schiller and their 
treatment of the imagination, genius and aesthetic common sense. He also 
uses this as a background to offer a warning to contemporary pragmatists, 
who he thinks have ignored this crucial connection, and ended up with a 
‘thinned out’ form of pragmatism as a result. He begins by focusing on the 
imagination, and the influence of Kant’s treatment of the schemata on Peirce, 
as well as the former’s conception of the creative imagination in the third 
Critique. Kaag then considers Kant’s account of genius and of Schiller’s play 
drive, both of which he links with Peirce’s view of the kind of creative process 
involved in abduction. Thirdly, he turns to Kant’s conception of the sensus 
communis, and the need for such universal common sense for 
communicability and knowledge, which in Peirce takes the form of an appeal 
to community. Kaag then argues that despite the importance of these themes, 
the account is not yet complete, as it has left out the significance of aesthetic 
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experience itself, where here (he argues) Schiller is a more important 
influence than Kant. He also argues that contemporary pragmatists have 
ignored this crucial element of the idealist heritage, and as a result have 
neglected the place of aesthetics and indeed experience itself in pragmatism, 
focusing on more technical and abstract issues instead.  
 
Finally, Giuseppina D’Oro considers a later phase in the connections between 
idealism and pragmatism, in her paper ‘Unlikely Bedfellows? Collingwood, 
Carnap, and the Internal/External Distinction’. Carnap’s logical positivism is 
often seen to incorporate crucial pragmatism elements, particularly 
concerning the choice of linguistic framework, which might therefore be 
expected to contrast with Collingwood’s more idealistic sympathies, and 
particularly his defense of metaphysics. However, D’Oro argues that there is 
in fact a deep affinity here, though some differences remain. D’Oro first 
considers Carnap’s crucial distinction between internal and external 
questions, where the latter relate to linguistic frameworks themselves, and 
thus cannot be assessed for truth or falsity, though they can be decided upon 
on grounds of utility. D’Oro then explores how this outlook can be compared 
to Collingwood’s treatment of absolute presuppositions, which again form a 
kind of framework to our inquiries and thus lack a truth value. However, while 
Carnap used his account to argue against metaphysics altogether, D’Oro 
agues that Collingwood gives metaphysics a revised role in identifying what 
these absolute presuppositions are, rather than in trying to step beyond them 
in a more traditional and ambitious manner.  
 
This difference between Carnap and Collingwood might be taken to reflect an 
underlying affinity of idealism for metaphysics and an underlying hostility of 
pragmatism against it. However, as this and the other papers in the collection 
show, we should be wary in making any such generalizations about these two 
traditions, where the complexity of the dialogue between them makes it 
unlikely that any such simplistic dichotomy can be sustained for long, whether 
it is a matter of metaphysics, or of ‘reason vs experience’, or ‘knowledge vs 
practice’, or ‘religion vs science’, or ‘realism vs idealism’. It is in adding depth 
to our appreciation of that complexity that the value of this collection is 
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intended to lie, and where it is hoped that its contribution can be made.9 
 
 
References 
 
Fichte, J. G. 1845-46. Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s sämmtliche Werke, edited I. H. 
Fichte, 8 vols. Berlin: Veit and Co. 
 
Fichte, J. G. 1982. “First Introduction to the Science of Logic,” in The Science 
of Logic, translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gava, Gabriele. Forthcoming. “What is Wrong With Intuitions? An 
Assessment of a Peircean Criticism of Kant”, Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society. 
 
Gava, Gabriele and Robert Stern, eds. 2015. Pragmatism, Kant, and 
Transcendental Philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Good, James A. 2006. A Search For Unity in Diversity: The “Permanent 
Hegelian Deposit” in the Philosophy of John Dewey. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
 
Hookway, Christopher. 2012. The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and 
Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
James, William James. 1975-88. The Works of William James, edited by 
Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. 19 vols. 
Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
                                                        
9 I am grateful to Chris Hookway for his help with the project and conference 
on which this publication is based, and for his encouragement more generally. 
I am also grateful for the support and advice of Mike Beaney as editor of the 
BJHP. Thanks are also due to all the contributors. 
Page 13 of 14
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Kenna, J. C. 1966. “Ten Unpublished Letters from William James, 1842-1910 
to Francis Herbert Bradley, 1846-1924.” Mind 75: 309-31. 
 
Peirce, Charles Sanders Peirce. 1958-66. Collected Papers. Vols. 1-6 edited 
by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; vols. 7-8 edited by A. W. Burks. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [references by 
volume and paragraph number]. 
 
Perry, Ralph Barton. 1936. The Thought of William James, 2 vols. Oxford: 
Oxford Unive sity Press. 
 
Westphal, Kenneth R. Forthcoming. “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and 
Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and 
Encyclopaedia.” Dialogue. 
 
 
 
Page 14 of 14
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
